Should it be objected that if so there cannot be a first cognition, and hencethere can be no cognition, the reply is that cognition proper arises gradually-- that during the first stage of incipient intelligence, before the feelingsproduced by intercourse with the outer world have been put into order, thereare no cognitions; and that, as every infant shows us, these slowly emergeout of the confusion of unfolding consciousness as fast as the experiencesare arranged into groups -- as fast as the most frequently repeated sensations,and their relations to one another, become familiar enough to admit of theirrecognition as such or such, whenever they recur. Should it be further objectedthat if cognition presupposes recognition, there can be no cognition, evenby an *****, of an object never before seen; there is still the sufficientanswer that in so far as it is not assimilated to previously-seen objectsit is not known, and that it is known only in so far as it is assimilatedto them. Of this paradox the interpretation is, that an object is classifiablein various ways with various degress of completeness. An animal hithertounknown (mark the word), though not referable to any established speciesor genus, is yet recognized as belonging to one of the larger divisions-mammals,birds, reptiles, or fishes; or should it be so anomalous that its alliancewith any of these is not determinable, it may yet be classed as vertebrateor invertebrate; or if it be one of those organisms in which it is doubtfulwhether the animal or vegetal traits predominate, it is still known as aliving body. Even should it be questioned whether it is organic, it remainsbeyond question that it is a material object, and it is cognized by beingrecognized as such. Whence it is clear that a thing is perfectly known onlywhen it is in all respects like certain things previously observed. thatin proportion to the number of respects in which it is unlike them, is theextent to which it is unknown; and that hence when it has absolutely no attributein common with anything else, it must be absolutely beyond the bound of knowledge.
Observe the corollary which here concerns us. A cognition of the Real,as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, if it exists, conform to thislaw of cognition in general. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute,to be known at all, must be classed. To be positively thought of, it mustbe thought of as such or such -- as of this or that kind. Can it be likein kind to anything of which we have experience? Obviously not. Between thecreating and the created, there must be a distinction transcending any ofthe distinctions between different divisions of the created. That which isUnCauSed cannot be assimilated to that which is caused: the two being, inthe very naming, antithetically opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped alongwith something finite; since, in being so grouped, it must be regarded asnot infinite. It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same category withanything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of which nonecessary relation can be predicated. Is it then that the Actual, thoughunthinkable by classification with the Apparent, is thinkable by classificationwith itself? This supposition is equally absurd with the other. It impliesthe plurality of the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute; and this implicationis self-contradictory. There cannot be more than one First Cause; seeingthat the existence of more than one would involve the existence of somethingnecessitating more than one, which something would be the true First Cause.
How self-destructive is the assumption of two or more Infinites, is manifeston remembering that such Infinites, by limiting each other, would becomefinite. And similarly, an Absolute which existed not alone but along withother Absolutes, would no longer be an absolute but a relative. The Unconditionedtherefore, as classable neither with any form of the conditioned nor withany other Unconditioned, cannot be classed at all. And to admit that it cannotbe known as of such or such kind, is to admit that it is unknowable.
Thus, from the very nature of thought, the relativity of our knowledgeis inferable in three ways. As we find by analyzing it, and as we see itobjectively displayed in every proposition, a thought involves relation,difference, likeness. Whatever does not present each of these does not admitof cognition. And hence we may say that the Unconditioned, as presentingnone of them, is trebly unthinkable. §25. From yet another point of view we may discern the same greattruth. If, instead of examining our intellectual powers directly as displayedin the act of thought, or indirectly as displayed in thought when expressedby words, we look at the connexion between the mind and the world, a likeconclusion is forced on us. The very definition of Life, phenomenally considered,when reduced to its most abstract shape, discloses this ultimate implication.
