But in these respects there is no decided difference between man and the animals.With them, as long as the weakness of their young endears them to their mothers,--in a word, associates them with their mothers,--the latter protect the former, at the peril of their lives, with a courage which reminds us of our heroes dying for their country.Certain species unite for hunting purposes, seek each other, call each other (a poet would say invite each other), to share their prey; in danger they aid, protect, and warn each other.The elephant knows how to help his companion out of the ditch into which the latter has fallen.
Cows form a circle, with their horns outward and their calves in the centre, in order to repel the attacks of wolves.Horses and pigs, on hearing a cry of distress from one of their number, rush to the spot whence it comes.What descriptions I might give of their marriages, the tenderness of the males towards the females, and the fidelity of their loves! Let us add, however,--to be entirely just--that these touching demonstrations of society, fraternity, and love of neighbor, do not prevent the animals from quarrelling, fighting, and outrageously abusing one another while gaining their livelihood and showing their gallantry; the resemblance between them and ourselves is perfect.
The social instinct, in man and beast, exists to a greater or less degree--its nature is the same.Man has the greater need of association, and employs it more; the animal seems better able to endure isolation.In man, social needs are more imperative and complex; in the beast, they seem less intense, less diversified, less regretted.Society, in a word, aims, in the case of man, at the preservation of the race and the individual; with the animals, its object is more exclusively the preservation of the race.
As yet, we have met with no claim which man can make for himself alone.The social instinct and the moral sense he shares with the brutes; and when he thinks to become god-like by a few acts of charity, justice, and devotion, he does not perceive that in so acting he simply obeys an instinct wholly animal in its nature.As we are good, loving, tender, just, so we are passionate, greedy, lewd, and vindictive; that is, we are like the beasts.Our highest virtues appear, in the last analysis, as blind, impulsive instincts.What subjects for canonization and apotheosis!
There is, however, a difference between us two-handed bipeds and other living creatures--what is it?
A student of philosophy would hasten to reply: "This difference lies in the fact that we are conscious of our social faculty, while the animals are unconscious of theirs--in the fact that while we reflect and reason upon the operation of our social instinct, the animals do nothing of the kind."I will go farther.It is by our reflective and reasoning powers, with which we seem to be exclusively endowed, that we know that it is injurious, first to others and then to ourselves, to resist the social instinct which governs us, and which we call JUSTICE.It is our reason which teaches us that the selfish man, the robber, the murderer--in a word, the traitor to society--sins against Nature, and is guilty with respect to others and himself, when he does wrong wilfully.Finally, it is our social sentiment on the one hand, and our reason on the other, which cause us to think that beings such as we should take the responsibility of their acts.Such is the principle of remorse, revenge, and penal justice.
But this proves only an intellectual diversity between the animals and man, not at all an affectional one; for, although we reason upon our relations with our fellows, we likewise reason upon our most trivial actions,--such as drinking, eating, choosing a wife, or selecting a dwelling-place.We reason upon things earthly and things heavenly; there is nothing to which our reasoning powers are not applicable.Now, just as the knowledge of external phenomena, which we acquire, has no influence upon their causes and laws, so reflection, by illuminating our instinct, enlightens us as to our sentient nature, but does not alter its character; it tells us what our morality is, but neither changes nor modifies it.Our dissatisfaction with ourselves after doing wrong, the indignation which we feel at the sight of injustice, the idea of deserved punishment and due remuneration, are effects of reflection, and not immediate effects of instinct and emotion.Our appreciation (I do not say exclusive appreciation, for the animals also realize that they have done wrong, and are indignant when one of their number is attacked, but), our infinitely superior appreciation of our social duties, our knowledge of good and evil, does not establish, as regards morality, any vital difference between man and the beasts.
% 2.--Of the first and second degrees of Sociability.
I insist upon the fact, which I have just pointed out, as one of the most important facts of anthropology.
