It is for the advantage of the whole number that the promises of each individual should be kept:and,rather than they should not be kept,that such individuals as fail to keep them should be punished.If it be asked,how this appears?
the answer is at hand:Such is the benefit to gain,and mischief to avoid,by keeping them,as much more than compensates the mischief of so much punishment as is requisite to oblige men to it.Whether the dependence of benefit and mischief (that is,of pleasure and pain)upon men's conduct in this behalf,be as here stated,is a question offact,to be decided,in the same manner that all other questions of fact are to be decided,by testimony,observation,and experience.(54)43.This then,and no other,being the reason why men should be made to keep their promises,viz,that it is for the advantage of society that they should,is a reason that may as well be given at once,why Kings,on the one hand,in governing,should in general keep within established Laws,and (to speak universally)abstain from all such measures as tend to the unhappiness of their subjects:and,on the other hand,why subjects should obey Kings as long as they so conduct themselves,and no longer;why they should obey in short so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance:why,in a word,taking the whole body together,it is their duty to obey,just so long as it is their interest,and no longer.This being the case,what need of saying of the one,that he PROMISED so to govern;of the other,that they PROMISEDso to obey,when the fact is otherwise?
44.True it is,that,in this country,according to ancient forms,some sort ofvague promise of good government is made by Kings at the ceremony of their coronation:and let the acclamations,perhaps given,perhaps not given,by chance persons out of the surrounding multitude,be construed into a promise of obedience on the part of the whole multitude:that whole multitude itself,a small drop collected together by chance out of the ocean of the state:and let the two promises thus made be deemed to have formed a perfect compact:not that either of them is declared to be the consideration of the other.
45.Make the most of this concession,one experiment there is,by which every reflecting man may satisfy himself,I think,beyond a doubt,that it is the consideration of utilily,and no other,that,secretly but unavoidably,has governed his judgment upon all these matters.The experiment is easy and decisive.It is but to reverse,in supposition,in the first place the import of the particular promise thus feigned;in the next place,the effect in point of utility of the observance of promises in general.Suppose the King to promise that he would govern his subjects not according to Law;not in the view to promote their happiness:would this be binding upon him?Suppose the people to promise they would obey him at all events,let him govern as he will;let him govern to their destruction.Would this be binding upon them?Suppose the constant and universal effect of an observance of promises were to produce mischief would it then be men's duty to observe them?Would it then be right to make Laws,and apply punishment to oblige men to observe them?
46.`No;'(it may perhaps be replied)`but for this reason;among promises,some there are that,as every one allows,are void:now these you have been supposing,are unquestionably of the number.A promise that is in itself void,cannot,it is true,create any obligation.But allow the promise to be valid,and it is the promise itself that creates the obligation,and nothing else.'The fallacy of this argument it is easy to perceive.
For what is it then that the promise depends on for its validity?what is it that beingpresent makes it valid?what is it that being wanting makes it void?To acknowledge that any one promise may be void,is to acknowledge that if any other is binding,it is not merely because it is a promise.
That circumstance then,whatever it be,on which the validity of a promise depends,that circumstance,I say,and not the promise itself must,it is plain,be the cause of the obligation which a promise is apt in general to carry with it.
47.But farther.Allow,for argument's sake,what we have dis proved:
allow that the obligation of a promise is independent of every other:allow that a promise is binding propriâvi Binding then on whom?
On him certainly who makes it.Admit this:For what reason is the same individual promise to be binding on those who never made it?The King,fifty years ago,promised my Great-Grandfather to govern him according to Law:my Great-Grandfather,fifty years ago,promised the King to obey him according to Law.The King,just now,promised my neighbour to govern him according to Law:my neigh bour,just now,promised the King to obey him according to LawBe it soWhat are these promises,all or any of them,to me?To make answer to this question,some other principle,it is manifest,must be resorted to,than that of the intrinsic obligation of promises upon those who make them.
48.Now this other principle that still recurs upon us,what other can it be than the principle of UTILITY?(55)The principle which furnishes us with that reason,which alone depends not upon any higher reason,but which is itself the sole and all-sufficient reason for every point of practice whatsoever.
